At first glance, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which heard oral arguments in January, appears to be a relatively inconsequential Supreme Court case. However, it could cause a complete overhaul of the American regulatory state in its current form. 

The circumstances of the case revolve around Loper Bright Enterprises, a fishing company based in New England. According to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, passed in 1976, the government can require federal inspectors to go on fishing vessels so that regulations may be enforced. Loper Bright is one of these companies, and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) mandates that the company, rather than the government agency, pay for these inspectors. Loper Bright estimated that the daily costs of these inspections were approximately $700. The fishery then sued the Department of Commerce in district court, and the case worked its way through appellate courts until the Supreme Court agreed to hear it in May 2023. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson has recused herself from the case due to being previously involved with it at a lower level.

The case could pose a challenge to a precedent colloquially named “Chevron deference” after the case that decided it, Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council. In this case, the court held that when Congress makes an unclear law, the interpretation of federal courts should generally submit to the interpretation of federal agencies. Loper Bright seeks to reverse this policy, because the rule that fisheries must pay for inspectors is not specified anywhere in codified law. Rather, the National Marine Fisheries Services interpreted the Magnuson–Stevens Act in that specific way.

One common argument made by opponents of Chevron deference is that the current precedent is unconstitutional. Specifically, they cite Section Two of Article Three of the U.S. Constitution, which states that “the judicial power shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made.” Therefore, they argue that federal agencies have no power to interpret statues from Congress. However, support for overturning this precedent goes further than constitutional grounds. Overturning Chevron would vastly curtail the power of federal agencies, and therefore federal regulation in general. Those who oppose government regulation of private business, such as libertarians, are therefore likely to support the precedent’s removal. As such, investigations by the New York Times show that lawyers representing the plaintiffs have received funds from or are employed by organizations connected to Charles Koch, a multibillionaire known for lobbying for right-wing causes.

Supporters of Chevron see it as integral for efficient and cohesive policy implementation by federal agencies. If overturned, interpretation of laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act or the Fair Housing Act would not be in the hands of experts in their respective fields, but rather at the whim of federal judges with both an overburdened caseload and less knowledge specific to the issue at hand. Justice Elena Kagan remarked on this issue during oral arguments, asking of the plaintiffs, “you think that the court should determine whether a new product is a dietary supplement or a drug, without giving deference to the agency?” 

While the court’s decision will not be announced until later this year, it is clear that the result will have wide reaching implications for decades to come.